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Pierre Schlag's The Aesthetics of American Law' seems to me to be
immediately illuminating, elegantly intricate, readily celebrated ....
Grids, force attributions, attention to perspective, disassociative transi-
tion effects: all appear-once described-to do much of the work of
ordering in legal writing and argument.2 Is there any clashing politics
implicit in this recognition? Apparently not: Aesthetics briefly sketches
a possible historical association of grids and conservatives, forces and
realists and their various heirs, and perspectives and identity politics.'
But it soon becomes clear that there is nothing necessary in these juxta-
positions. Thus, the example of corporate law that Pierre Schlag
explores to great effect need be amplified only a little further to show
that all four of the aesthetic configurations he identifies are useful (and
used) in ordinary business jurisprudence-constituents, therefore, of the
most obvious status quo.4
Sometimes, at least, universality or neutrality can be subversive.
Schlag's readers get the impression that all legal projects, however
sharply particular they appear to be, consist mostly of the play of com-
* Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002)
[hereinafter Schlag, Aesthetics].
2. These are all terms that Pierre Schlag puts to work, and that cannot be explained in detail
short of reproducing his essay. For present purposes, it is enough (I think) to connect use of grids
in legal reasoning with the invocation and enforcement of arrangements of more or less mutually
exclusive categories like, say, tort and contract or substance and procedure or (in the older
constitutional law) manufacturing and commerce. See id. at 1055-70. Force (or energy) is the
underlying notion deployed in balancing tests (opposing forces) and equilibrium analyses of
various kinds (attributions of tendencies). See id. at 1070-80. The possibility of differing
perspectives is the starting point, for example, for analyses of institutional constraints, assertions
of the importance of various social identities, "we/they" accounts of constitutional law, and the
like. See id. at 1081-92. Disassociative arguments call attention to the incompleteness of the
other aesthetics; in turn, of course, the other aesthetics implicitly critique disassociative
arguments. See id. at 1092-1101.
3. Id. at 1053-54.
4. See id. at 1094-95. The idea of the corporation as a legal entity as such-in law, an
individual-helps fill out the grid of legal "persons," as do taxonomies of shareholders, creditors,
stakeholders, and the like. References to markets for corporate control or informationally efficient
capital markets, as well as critiques of these ideas, suppose that equilibrium effects matter. It is
enough simply to mention the term "insider trading" to show how prominent the sense of
perspective is in corporate law. Cases concerned with legal disregard of the corporate entity-
even if sometimes preoccupied with the vividly forceful rhetoric of "piercing the corporate
veil"-are plainly disassociative, obviously ad hoc in reasoning and result, precisely after the
fashion of this last aesthetic.
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mon elements. These elements, moreover, are oddly massless-modes
of presentation implying nothing at all about the existence of underlying
structures or processes, motivating historical triumphs or outrages,
recurring socio-psychological needs or warps, or the like. All legal
projects float free-the moral equivalent of whipped cream.
This brief essay reaches towards a third thought. I think that Pierre
Schlag is right to overlay law and aesthetics. But that overlay does not
dictate his decision to pitch his characterizations in relatively abstract
terms, and to trace their interplay at the same high level. It might be
possible to proceed otherwise.5 Aesthetic effects may result from deci-
sions to call to attention and manipulate or alter what are ordinarily
barely noticed, altogether mundane assumptions or conventions concern-
ing presentation. To take two obvious examples: It was supposed for a
long time that the paint in paintings was to be applied mainly with a
brush; it is still ordinarily assumed that the lines of a poem, as they
appear on a printed page, should not overlap each other. These expecta-
tions, we know, can be made explicit and challenged as a matter of artis-
tic strategy, at times with great effect.6 Are like strategies available in
law?
Here I seek out repetition repeatedly. I take as points of departure
Correction, a translated edition of a novel by the Austrian writer
Thomas Bernhard,7 Ernest Weinrib's The Idea of Private Law,8 Palsgraf
v. Long Island Railroad,9 and one chapter of Difference and Repetition,
a translation of a philosophical-psychological dissertation written by
Gilles Deleuze.' ° Repetition, from one perspective, verges on writerly
bad manners (except in cases of terms of art). This sometimes stupe-
fying formal device, however, can also be deployed to deliberate effect.
Repetition figures as a formal counterpart of, or substitute for, substance
or structure. Attention to repetition, as a result, becomes a first step at
least, a means of extracting jurisprudence. Or so I will try to show.
5. There is no reason to suppose that Pierre Schlag would disagree. See id. at 1051 (noting
"four such aesthetics").
6. See, e.g., James Coddington, No Chaos Damn It, in JACKSON POLLACK: NEW
APPROACHES 101-15 (Kirk Vamedoe & Pepe Karmel eds., 1999); Susan Howe, A Bibliography of
the King's Book, or Eikon Basilike, in THE NONCONFORMIST'S MEMORIAL 45-82 (1993).
Departures of this sort, of course, are not unique to modem or contemporary work.
7. THOMAS BERNHARD, CORRECTION (Sophie Wilkins trans., 1990).
8. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
9. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).




In Correction, Thomas Bernhard deploys three principal devices.
He divides the text into two (only two) paragraphs of roughly equal
length. The first runs about one hundred forty pages, the second about
one hundred thirty pages. Individual sentences are often very long, usu-
ally organized simply as sequences of phrases divided by commas.
Sentences or groups of sentences frequently exhibit much internal repe-
tition. Phrases recur, or are modified only slightly; repetition occurs
often enough to be one of the most prominent features of the text.
These devices politicize the process of reading. The reader is left
without the help of important ordinary cues in the absence of regular
paragraphing, and the frequent presence of sentences running on, phrase
after phrase, without internal differentiation, too long to be compre-
hended as a unit. Reading becomes work. The reader is made aware
that persisting in reading Correction is a conscious choice. The repeti-
tions compound the difficulty of reading as such; more importantly, they
allow the substance of what is repeated to be presented to the reader in a
forceful, almost violent way-communicating an intensity, a kind of
volume, that the reader cannot readily moderate or otherwise filter.
Again, the reader becomes aware that reading is difficult work, costly,
continuously a matter of choice and not momentum. Correction thus
formally provokes and tests the commitment of the reader-demands
active involvement, complicity, or enlistment as it were. The substance
of the novel, it will become apparent, makes clear what that participation
ultimately entails. Correction positions its reader as a judge-indeed,
demands judgment-with regard to the content of Correction itself.
The events Bernhard's novel claims as its points of departure can
be briefly summarized."l Roithamer, heir to the lands and fortune of a
wealthy Austrian family, is also an accomplished scientist, a professor of
genetics at Cambridge University. He decides to spend his inheritance
constructing a house for his sister, located at the exact center of a large
forest. The house is in the shape of a cone (the "Cone"). Roithamer
does not discuss this project with his sister, who becomes ill and dies
shortly after visiting the Cone for the first time. Roithamer commits
suicide. Bernhard spends surprisingly little space in Correction filling
in the details of these events. Rather, the text presents two seeming
streams of consciousness (each depicted in one of the two paragraphs).
The first purports to be the thoughts of Roithamer's literary executor
11. Because of its many repetitions, close footnoting of Correction would be tantamount to
constructing a concordance. For other summaries (and also differing readings), see, e.g., STEPHEN
D. DOWDEN, UNDERSTANDING THOMAS BERNHARD 36-41 (1991); GITTA HONEGGER, THOMAS
BERNHARD: THE MAKING OF AN AUSTRIAN 161-65 (2001).
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(never identified by name), a childhood friend and now a mathematician
colleague at Cambridge, who has come to the home of Hoeller, also a
childhood friend of Roithamer and the executor. Hoeller designed and
built his home in a gorge above a powerful river; it was in the garret of
this home that Roithamer worked out his plans for the Cone; many of his
papers remain there. The second stream presents itself as an accumula-
tion of Roithamer's attempts to explain his project and himself, before
and after his sister's illness and death, indeed down to just before his
suicide.
The two streams each include frequent battering repetitions under-
scoring extreme emotions. The thoughts of the literary executor range
widely and anxiously, touching on memories of childhood, the execu-
tor's sense of Roithamer's circumstances, efforts, and death, aspects of
the character of ordinary life in Hoeller's home (for example, the effect
of the continuous roar of the river through the gorge), Hoeller's taxi-
dermy work at home, and the difficulties involved in serving as
Roithamer's literary executor. The executor's account culminates in his
description of a panic episode, in which the executor spills and intermin-
gles a huge quantity of Roithamer's notes, thereby making their organi-
zation seemingly impossible. Until the last few pages of defenses and
doubts, Roithamer's part consists mostly of extended denunciation of his
family and repeated insistence upon the importance of ruthless, thor-
ough-going analysis.
In both parts, discussions of editorial sensibility are prominent.
Roithamer's working procedures include a distinctive use of texts:
I had squirreled away in Hoeller's garret every conceivable book and
paper I could lay hands on and that could be of use to me, as well as
all the books and papers I could do without, and I'd torn the pages I
most valued out of these essential books and papers and tacked them
on the walls of Hoeller's garret, pages of Pascal, for instance, again
and again, much of Montaigne, very many pages of Pushkin and
Schopenhauer, of Novalis and Dostoyevsky, I'd tacked almost all the
pages of Valdry's M. Teste on the walls before I'd covered the walls
of Hoeller's garret with my plans and sketches for building the Cone;
to gain perspective I've always pasted or tacked all the papers impor-
tant to me on my walls, even as a child I'd covered the walls of my
room in Altensam with other people's most important (to me) ideas,
pasted or tacked on, so I'd first covered the walls of Hoeller's garret
with the most important sayings of Pascal and Novalis and
Montaigne, before I'd tacked them up and pasted them up with my
sketches and anyway all kinds of ideas for building the Cone, and so I
always could immediately clear out of Altensam and move into Hoel-
ler's garret and find refuge in Hoeller's garret in those thoughts on
the walls of Hoeller's garret, the fact that it is possible for me to go to
[Vol. 57:607
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Hoeller's garret where I always found everything I needed for my
thoughts and reflections, all those thoughts of other men and through
them, also all my own thoughts... .2
Texts such as these are to be put to use, but also to be put to the side.
For Roithamer, they supply working materials to be subjected to his own
ordering, to be preempted by his own work. Roithamer is emphatic
(also despairing) in his rejection of inter-relating texts (characteristically
legal):
We reject everything having to do with contracts, because we reject
bureaucracy in toto, but in fact the world is only held together by a
patchwork of contracts, as we soon perceive, and in this network of
hundreds and thousands and hundreds of thousands and millions and
billions of contracts the trapped human beings are squirming.
There's no way to get around contracts except by suicide. Contracts
everywhere, they've already choked everything to death, a whole
world choking to death on its contracts, so Roithamer. To suppose
that it is possible to exist without contracts or other written agree-
ments and run away, anywhere at all, is to find ourselves soon caught
again in contracts and written agreements, anyone who thinks other-
wise is a madman, a malicious falsifier of the nature of things. It's
only in childhood that we don't know what kind of a trap it is in
which we squirm and despair and keep on despairing as we go on
squirming in it, ignorant that these are the nets of contracts and other
written agreements made by the grown-ups, by history. If anyone
were to succeed in doing away with all these contracts and other writ-
ten agreements, all he'd have accomplished would be the end of the
whole world. In the future, where everything is possible, this too is
possible. But so far it hasn't been possible, nor is it possible in the
immediate future, so Roithamer, the foreseeable future is all con-
tracts, written agreements, and the resulting fits of despair, impedi-
ments, sicknesses, causes of death, that's all. Our entire being is tied
to contracts, written agreements, assessments, we're trapped in them
for life, no matter what we do, no matter who we are. Still we keep
trying all our lives to escape from these contracts and other written
agreements, efforts as painful as they are senseless, so Roithamer."3
Roithamer is entirely consistent. He subjects his own writing to a kind
of exclusionary rule, conceiving of editing not as elaboration or overlay
or some other expression of inter-connection, but as obliteration and
replacement.
I was once more in the same state in which I've always been
when I believed I was finished with something, at such a moment I
know it's all the other way round, and I'm willing to do it over the
12. BERNHARD, supra note 7, at 223-24.
13. Id. at 153.
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other way around. Little by little a new manuscript would be the
result, as it is now again, an entirely different, new manuscript result-
ing from the destruction of the old one ... 14
This conception of editing-"correction"-is (for Roithamer) as
applicable to people's lives as to texts, and as applied in life points to a
decisive possibility:
We're constantly correcting, and correcting ourselves, most rigor-
ously, because we recognize at every moment that we did it all wrong
(wrote it, thought it, made it all wrong), acted all wrong, how we
acted all wrong, that everything to this point in time is a falsification,
so we correct this falsification, and then we again correct the correc-
tion of this falsification and we correct the result of the correction of
a correction andsoforth, so Roithamer. But the ultimate correction is
one we keep delaying, the kind others have made without ado from
one minute to the next, I think, . . . whom we knew, as we thought,
whom we knew so thoroughly, yet we didn't really know all these
peoples' characters, because their self-correction took us by surprise,
otherwise we wouldn't have been surprised by their ultimate existen-
tial correction, their suicide. 5
At the end, Roithamer thinks through his own circumstances in precisely
these terms:
[B]est of all was not to let a new one come into being, to stop making
positive corrections, best to destroy it altogether, so Roithamer.
When I make corrections, I destroy, when I destroy, I annihilate, so
Roithamer. What I used to consider an improvement, formerly, is
after all nothing but deterioration, destruction, annihilation. Every
correction is destruction, annihilation, so Roithamer. This manu-
script too is nothing but a mad aberration, just as perhaps and with
certainty, "with certainty" underlined, the erection of the Cone was
nothing but a mad aberration, those who always regarded the building
of the Cone as a mad aberration, seem to have been proven basically
right, so the manuscript was also nothing but a mad aberration, but
he'd have to accept responsibility for this mad aberration and take it
to its logical conclusion, it was absolute madness, so Roithamer, to
build the Cone and to write this manuscript . . ., and these two crazy
acts, one resulting from the other and both with the utmost ruthless-
ness, have done me in, "have done me in" underlined.' 6
The last word of the manuscript, it would seem, refers not only to the
place but to the purpose of his suicide: "Clearing."' 7
14. Id. at 266.
15. Id. at 242.
16. Id. at 266-67.
17. Id. at 271.
[Vol. 57:607
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Of course, the manuscript that Correction puts before its readers as
Roithamer's was not destroyed, although it was edited (editorial inser-
tions, as the preceding quotations illustrate, show up intermittently in the
text). Plainly, the literary executor did not adopt-or at least did not
carry through to conclusion-Roithamer's own editorial philosophy.
The question of editing is one of the preoccupations of the first part of
Correction.
Early on, the literary executor is fearful of the overwhelming effect
of Roithamer's ideas.
... I was too weak to confront Roithamer's mental world head on,
knowing that I had never been a match for Roithamer's ideas and
what he did with them, but had, in fact, sometimes succumbed
entirely to these ideas and actions of Roithamer's, whatever
Roithamer thought I also thought, whatever he practiced, I believed I
also had to practice .... he warned me to take care, not to give in to
this tendency, because a man who no longer thinks his own thoughts
.... ,such a man is in constant danger of doing himself in by his
continual thinking of the other man's thoughts, in danger of deaden-
ing himself out of existence.... Since my thinking had actually been
Roithamer's thinking, during all that time I simply had not been in
existence, I'd been nothing, extinguished by Roithamer's think-
ing.... My extinction by Roithamer's thinking probably lasted until
Roithamer's death .... 18
The executor at times fears for his own safety.
[I]n giving me this task he may well have meant to destroy me, which
is why I lived in constant fear, actually, of getting involved with this
legacy of his, I fully expected to be annihilated or at least destroyed
or at the very least to become permanently disturbed by it, irreparably
chronically disturbed.19
He hits upon a strategy:
For me to bring together all these bits and pieces, perhaps to put them
in the right relation to each other so as to make a whole out of all
these bits and pieces of his thought, something to be published, was
out of the question, for I'd had to consider, from my first contact with
Roithamer's papers, that they consist for the most part of mere frag-
ments which he had intended to combine into a whole himself, after
completing or perfecting... the Cone.... So what we have here are
in fact hundreds, or thousands, of fragments which Roithamer left to
me, but which I shall not edit, because I have no right to edit them,
anyway no one has a right, no matter who is editing what, he never
has a right to do it, . . . I shall not commit this editorial crime .... I
shall put Roithamer's papers in order, sift them, then possibly pass
18. Id. at 25-26.
19. Id. at 116.
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them on to his publisher .... I would sort and sift Roithamer's leg-
acy, . . . but I will not edit it I won't change a line, I won't move a
comma, I shall sort and sift it ....0
But this is not what happens.
On my arrival here I actually put only Roithamer's so-called major
work, the manuscript on Altensam and everything connected with
Altensam, with special attention to the Cone, into the desk drawer,
while the rest of the papers were still in the knapsack . . . I . ..
suddenly grabbed the knapsack and turned it over and dumped its
contents on the sofa .... I went over to the sofa and grabbed handful
after handful of the Roithamer legacy and crammed the desk drawers
full of it. . . . I had done a terrible thing. . . . [I]n unpacking the
knapsack, by abruptly turning the knapsack over on the sofa, I had
probably, I thought, mixed the papers up even more hopelessly than
before. And since Roithamer's papers are hardly ever dated or num-
bered or anything, as I know for a fact, there was no hope at all that I
could ever put them in order again ......
The executor had earlier outlined his plan for the Cone manuscript.
I shall pass it on to his publisher untouched, just as I found it, the first
eight-hundred-page draft, and the second three-hundred-page revision
of this first draft, and the third version, boiled down to only eighty
pages, of the second version, . . . for all three versions belong
together, each deriving from the previous one, they compose a whole,
an integral whole of over a thousand pages in which everything is
equally significant so that even the most minor deletion would reduce
it all to nothing, . . . each a revision of the previous version about
which he could not help being of two minds, . . .he finally, just
before his death .... in fact, had started on the train revising even his
final eighty-page version, correcting it and taking it apart and
thereby, as he believed, starting to destroy it and by proceeding to
shorten even that latest shortest version, as he believed, to arrive at an
even shorter one, . . .ultimately leaving absolutely nothing of the
entire work behind, that all of it together came into being, all this
taken together is the complete work....
This was no longer an available option. The executor's thoughts con-
clude ambiguously, at least with regard to the strategy he would follow
with the Cone manuscript. "I thought, just before falling asleep, how
utterly exhausted I felt. In the morning I'll sneak up on Roithamer's
legacy, I'll just sort of sneak up on it first, then I'll sift it and sort it."
'23
Does the editor propose to recover the Cone manuscript as it was, ulti-
20. Id. at 127-30.
21. Id. at 132-33.
22. Id. at 130-31.
23. Id. at 140.
[Vol. 57:607
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mately to pass it on "untouched," a "complete work"? But there is now
"no hope" of "order." What does "sift" and "sort" mean now?
Correction names Roithamer's part "Sifting and Sorting."24 It is
not "over a thousand pages," just one hundred thirty. One hundred thirty
pages, though, is longer than either the "final" eighty page draft or the
even shorter product of Roithamer's last corrections. The reader of
Thomas Bernhard's novel, obliged by the difficult form of the text to
attend carefully to its words, discovers that the text turns on itself. Cor-
rection puts into play-requires its reader to choose from among the
proffered options-the fictions that the reader needs to treat as true for
purposes of reading." If Roithamer's part is read as a whole, it is not
Roithamer's, at least not within the editorial approach with which
Roithamer himself is associated. The reader should have been left with
only the last few pages, or perhaps (taken to the limit-Roithamer's own
preferred course) nothing at all: "Clearing." The last few pages, how-
ever, question all that Roithamer had thought previously and this should
include, presumably, his editorial approach as well. But if this were the
case, shouldn't Roithamer, having given up his particular idea of correc-
tion, rejected the parallel logic of suicide as well? The second part of
Correction is also not the entirety of Roithamer's accumulated Cone
manuscripts. They have been "sifted and sorted." Roithamer's part is
the literary executor's work product. Is it therefore an "editorial crime"?
Or is only an editor's "correction" in Roithamer's sense what the execu-
tor means by "editorial crime"? If "sifting and sorting" is different, how
can the reader determine that this is so? That which sifting excludes is
missing just as much as that which an editor annihilates. It is clear, at
least, that the literary executor does not regard suicide as self-editing.
Suicide, the executor muses at one point, is a kind of environmental
risk-part and parcel of living in Austria-and thus like disease or geo-
graphic hazards, more a matter of bad luck, less a matter of individual
judgment.
The editorial irresolution that Correction propagates clouds the
overall structure of the novel itself. It is not even clear if Roithamer and
his suicide are supposed to be the principal focus. If only the last-
drafted writing matters, the passages in which the executor describes his
thoughts and reactions at Hoeller's house take priority. Of course, those
passages reject the idea of editorial correction as annihilation in favor of
sifting and sorting. It is not clear why this last strategy isn't as available
to Correction's reader as to the literary executor; if so, we might think,
individual passages in Correction, perhaps some of the especially vivid
24. Id. at 141.
25. See MICHAEL RIFFATERRE, FICTIONAL TRUTH 1-6, 33, 52 (1990).
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repetitive sequences (hateful, bizarre, poignant, and so forth), might be
what the reader is likely to take away, rather than any particular conclu-
sion drawn from Roithamer's conduct or the executor's predicament.
Reading, the reader must judge-decide which of the alternative
interpretive strategies to adopt. Perhaps this is always the case. Thomas
Bernhard, however, makes readerly adjudication seem to be an espe-
cially pressing, and at the same time difficult responsibility. And yet:
Correction is not simply a mess. Its spiraling possibilities, opening up
the structure as well as the content of the novel, are contained within the
novel. Formal idiosyncrasies, it turns out, are functionally central.
Bernhard uses (abuses) utterly ordinary surface features of the text-
paragraphing, sentence structure, word repetitions-to attract and organ-
ize the reader's attention. As a result, the questions of structure and
content that would seem to be more important, that would seem to
require resolution first and foremost, present themselves to the reader
mostly in passing, in the course of the work of reading, the effort to
come to terms with formal transgressions that Bernhard sets up as the
reader's always immediate task. Judgment is postponed, accordingly,
until the conclusion of Correction, until (as it were) the construction of
the record as a whole.
B.
Ernest Weinrib does not write at all like Thomas Bernhard.
Weinrib's great provocation, The Idea of Private Law ("Idea"),
observes all the usual writerly conventions, and plainly means to present
itself to its reader as readily accessible, an essay in coherent, intelligible
prose. Idea indeed elaborates its account of private law precisely within
terms embracing and enforcing coherence. Weinrib proposes a version
of legal formalism. Idea "first elucidates a[n] . . . internal principle of
organization" characteristic of private law; discussions of "considera-
tions of substance" (most of Weinrib's specific examples come from the
Anglephone common law of torts) proceed "in the light of this formal
principle."26 To give content to this program, Idea makes coherence its
chief "internal principle": "Coherence goes beyond mutual consistency
or noncontradiction to the underlying unity of the elements that
cohere.... [T]he features of a juridical relationship cohere when their
justifications not merely coexist in the relationship but form an inte-
grated justificatory ensemble ... ."27 Weinrib elaborates.
Coherence, accordingly, signifies the intrinsic unity of the features
that cohere. Unless the justificatory momentum of one feature carries
26. WEINRIB, supra note 8, at 25.
27. Id. at 33.
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over to the others, the relationship as a whole does not hold together.
Conversely, if the consideration that justifies one feature of a legal
relationship is independent of the consideration that justifies any
other, the relationship is incoherent to that extent.
28
Intrinsic unity? Justificatory momentum? In practice Weinrib puts
these notions to use straightforwardly. He insists repeatedly that seem-
ingly different ideas or perspectives are just variations of each other-
repetitions, as it were. Coherence, given repetition, therefore obtains.
This remarkable paragraph is emblematic:
I have reached the correlativity of right and duty by elucidating the
intimate connection between corrective justice and Kantian right.
Following through on Aristotle's indication that correlative gain and
loss operate from a baseline of equality that abstracts from the partic-
ularities of social rank and virtue, I identified that equality with the
abstracting notion of agency that undergirds Kantian right. On this
view, the equality of corrective justice expresses the Kantian concep-
tion of normativeness in external relationships. Being variants from a
normative baseline, the gains and losses are correlative in their nor-
mative and not in their factual aspects. The nexus of right and duty
under Kantian right captures this normative correlativity.29
Aristotle, Kant, Weinrib! Weinrib "identifies" Aristotle's idea of cor-
rective justice and Kant's idea of agency and right-that is, according to
Weinrib, Aristotle and Kant can be treated as elaborating versions of
pretty much the same notion, even if adopting different starting points,3°
and also pretty much the same notion-"normative correlativity"-that
Weinrib himself applies and endorses. (I will discuss what Weinrib
means by "normative correlativity" shortly.) Obviously, obviously, obvi-
ously: Weinrib is surely not accidentally ahistorical. He expects readers
of Idea to recall-we should suppose-the centuries separating Aristotle
and Kant and Weinrib and all the on-going intellectual tumult and trans-
formation. His indifference to all this, his assertion that he and Kant and
Aristotle are all amplifying and in a way repeating each other, and are
therefore properly invokable to explain each other, is a kind of dramati-
zation or advertisement. Weinrib's conception of coherence, and the
notion of normative correlativity it prompts and informs, carry strong
connotations-we are encouraged to think-and therefore should be
taken seriously.
I do not mean to suggest that Aristotle and Kant figure only orna-
mentally in The Idea of Private Law. Corrective justice and individual
agency are obviously not Weinrib's own inventions. But within his defi-
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id. at 126.
30. See generally id.
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nition of normative correlativity-which is both his term and the term
that does the most work within his analysis-Weinrib plainly gives pri-
ority to the originating idea of coherence "to illuminate the inner work-
ings of the private law relationship."'"
To satisfy the dimension of correlativity, the justificatory considera-
tions at work in corrective justice must be unifying, bipolar, and
expressive of transactional equality. . . .[F]or normative gain and
normative loss to be relative to each other, the same norm must be the
baseline for both. . . . [B]ecause one party's normative gain is the
other's normative loss, the justificatory considerations must link two,
and only two, parties .... [B]y being equally applicable to the party
realizing the gain and to the party suffering the loss, they accord a
preferential position to neither.
32
Strong conclusions follow: "[A] justificatory consideration that fits into
the normative structure of corrective justice cannot have a justificatory
force that reaches only one of the parties."33 Familiar concerns for com-
pensation and deterrence in tort law become irrelevant. 34 Negligence
law is largely defensible, but strict liability is largely not.35
Ernest Weinrib is not Thomas Bernhard. The Idea of Private Law,
however, putting reiteration to work at every turn, minimizing differ-
ences and underscoring repetition, organizes and presses the substance
of its argument in a fashion strikingly reminiscent of the way Correction
structures its form in order to govern its readers. It is tempting, more-
over, to imagine Weinrib and Roithamer as brothers in arms. The
abstracted equivalences of coherence and correlativity, the capacity and
demand for rigor that these formulas define, build up an account of cor-
rective justice, we might think, that is pretty much the jurisprudential
counterpart of the Cone. But Bernhard divided Correction. The execu-
tor espouses "sifting and sorting," an editorial strategy in opposition to
Roithamer's annihilatory simplification. Is there a similar counter-
weight evident in Weinrib's elaboration of his Idea? Not explicitly-
although Weinrib introduces his own analysis as "contrasting," as a
departure from "the standard view."36 Does Weinrib expect readers of
31. Id. at 114.
32. Id. at 120.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 121-22.
35. Id. at 145-203.
36. Id. at 2. Weinrib characterizes "the standard view"-including notions of compensation
and deterrence, and also the distinctive perspectives of law and economics-in terms that in the
first instance serve to illustrate what he believes to be the very different emphases of his own
approach. We might wonder whether, outside The Idea of Private Law, there is a "standard view"
as such, or rather a complex of overlapping, but also in some ways differing, or at least differently
nuanced, accounts. There is, obviously, good narrative reason for Weinrib to stylize approaches
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The Idea of Private Law, even as they, consider his argument, to also
consider an alternative perspective?
C.
Usefully in this respect, Weinrib includes in his elaboration of
coherence and correlativity discussions of judicial work in a few famous
cases.37  The best known-Palsgraf,38 inevitably-serves as an espe-
cially telling medium for present purposes. Its strange facts, along with
the ambitious, disagreeing judicial opinions in the case, together func-
tion as a kind of legal theory Rorschach, readily provocative of alterna-
tive visions.39
Chief Justice Cardozo's majority opinion, emphasizing "relation"
as key to the existence of a duty of care, is made to order for Professor
Weinrib:
[Cardozo] integrates wrongfulness and the resulting injury. Only
when the plaintiffs injury is within the risk that renders the defen-
dant's act wrongful is the plaintiff entitled to recover in tort. Then,
because the plaintiff's right is the ground of the duty that the defen-
dant breached, the parties are intrinsically united in a single juridical
relationship.4"
Weinrib treats this sentence as the crux of Cardozo's analysis: "The risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed and risk
imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of
that he treats as foils. These approaches, were they to be restored to full detail, would swamp
discussion here; thus, in the next section I draw a narrower contrast.
37. See, e.g., id. at 148-52, 196-203.
38. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
39. [A]n explosion at one end of a... [railroad] station overturned a scale that fell on
the plaintiff, . . . standing at the end of the platform. The explosion occurred when a
railroad guard pushed a passenger into a crowded train and accidentally knocked a
package of fireworks he was carrying onto the tracks.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 61 (1992). Horwitz is less interested in the "bizarre series of events," id.,
than in the Palsgraf opinions as exemplars of the declining confidence in "objective causation" in
the first decades of the twentieth century. See id. at 61-63. See also G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT
LAW IN AMERICA 94-101 (1980) (noting that opinions show, albeit incompletely, emergence of
interest-balancing as replacement for earlier theories of causation); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, Palsgraf
Revisited, in SELECTED TOpICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 228-34 ("The Problem of the Place to
Stop."). For discussions of Palsgraf finding keys in aspects of the facts of the case itself, see, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 33-41 (1990); Robert L. Rabin, The
Historical Development of the Fault System: A Reinterpretation, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW
68 (Robert L. Rabin ed., 4th ed. 1995).
40. WEINRIB, supra note 8, at 160. Weinrib argues at length that Justice Andrew's dissent-
positing a duty of care to the world at large coupled with a proximate cause limitation-is
incoherent. See id. at 161-64. "The breach of the obligation at large wrongs everyone who has
been injured as a result, but only an arbitrarily specified subset made up of those whose injuries
are proximate can receive compensation in tort." Id. at 161.
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apprehension."41
Versions of the sentence are in fact repeated throughout Palsgraf.
Read together, they disclose a recurring metaphor:
The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation
to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the
plaintiff, standingfar away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at
all. Nothing in the situation gave notice that the falling package had
in it the potency of peril to persons thus removed.4 2
If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act
innocent and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with reference to
her, did not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to
43be a wrong....
[T]he orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigi-
lance would be the orbit of the duty.44
We are told that one who drives at reckless speed through a crowded
city street is guilty of a negligent act and therefore of a wrongful one
irrespective of the consequences. Negligent the act is, and wrongful
in the sense that it is unsocial, but wrongful and unsocial in relation
to other travelers, only because the eye of vigilance perceives the risk
of damage.45
The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed,
and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the
range of apprehension.
4 6
If the harm was not willful, he must show that the act as to him had
possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be
protected against the doing of it though the harm was unintended.
4 7
Duty originates in vision, in seeing-not in the abstract, moreover,
rather in the particular, within the precise point of view, "the orbit of...
the eye," "the range of apprehension," of the defendant. What must the
defendant see? Cardozo does not suppose that the defendant must liter-
ally see the plaintiff: He reaches the same result as Justice Andrews in
the hypothetical case of the speeding car by treating knowledge of the
presence of "other travelers" as a group as enough, and emphasizing
rather more the perceptible risk of "reckless speed. '48 In the case at
41. Id. at 160 (quoting Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100).
42. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99 (emphases added).
43. Id. (emphases added).
44. Id. at 100 (emphases added).
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. Id. (emphases added) (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
48. Andrews famously supposed:
Should we drive down Broadway at a reckless speed, we are negligent whether we
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hand, accordingly, the decisive fact becomes the inability of the passen-
ger car guard to see that the package about to fall contained explosives.
"It was a package of small size, about fifteen inches long, and was cov-
ered by a newspaper. In fact it contained fireworks, but there was noth-
ing in its appearance to give notice of its contents."49
The defendant in Palsgraf was the Long Island Railroad Company,
not the passenger car guard personally. Shouldn't the relevant point of
view therefore be that of the railroad company? This question appears
to take the corporate personality fiction too seriously. All the same, it is
not especially difficult to summarize the corporate view if we consider
the implications of the corporate document that, in an important sense, is
the beginning of Helen Palsgraf's misfortune. That document is the
train schedule. It discloses that numbers of trains arrive and leave at
given stations within relatively short intervals, and therefore discloses as
well the possibility that recently arriving and soon departing passengers
are likely, most of the time, to be near trains but not on board. Espe-
cially importantly, the schedule shows that trains leave not when all
would-be passengers are on board, but at the times the schedule
designates. The schedule both creates and suggests the possibility that,
at the time of every departure, there may be persons attempting to board
trains already in motion.5" The schedule thus frames the question that
the guard in Palsgraf faced: What is to be done with last minute passen-
gers? From the perspective of the schedule, as it were, this question is
not unique to the circumstances in Palsgraf. It presents itself, in princi-
ple, in the circumstances of every fixed-time departure-as recurring in
a very large number of repeated cases.5
Viewed this way, the possibility that running passengers might
drop packages, and that packages might pose risks to waiting, departing,
and arriving passengers on adjacent platforms, becomes analytically
manageable for railroad officials. 52 The contingency will recur often
strike an approaching car or miss it by an inch. The act itself is wrongful. It is a
wrong not only to those who happen to be within the radius of danger, but to all
who might have been there-a wrong to the public at large. Such is the language of
the street. Such the language of the courts....
Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 99.
50. For provocative illustrations, see BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN
LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920 25-26, 46 (2001).
51. "On steam trains boarding and alighting combined amounted to roughly one quarter of all
accidents involving nonemployees." Id. at 21. Systematic collection of railroad safety data
developed relatively early, under the pressure of state regulators. See id. at 8-13.
52. Railroad operations were an early occasion for development of techniques of rational
administration and analysis. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE:
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 21-23, 38-39 (1962).
Bureaucratic forms of decisionmaking in both business and government were well-accepted and
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enough in potential, as it were: Even if dangerous packages are very
rare, the likelihood that the contingency will materialize at least few
times might be quite high. Chief Justice Cardozo had no difficulty
imagining variations of the Palsgraf facts. "A guard stumbles over a
package which has been left upon a platform.... It turns out to be a can
of dynamite."53 "One who jostles another's neighbor in a crowd does
not invade the rights of others standing at the outer fringe when the
unintended contact casts a bomb upon the ground. The wrongdoer as to
them is the man who carries the bomb. . . -5' The problem, he thought,
was that individuals could not fit these unlikely but horrible contingen-
cies into what were otherwise the immediate, almost automatic decisions
of everyday life. "Life will have to be made over, and human nature
transformed, before prevision so extravagant can be accepted as the
norm of conduct. . . ."" But railroad officials alert to the implications of
their schedules would be able to perceive the matter in more general
terms, to perceive the possibility of both horrible and harmless cases,
and thus to address the question of whether they have available means of
addressing and abating the full range of risk. Why not, for example,
issue an order to passenger car guards prohibiting any assistance or
encouragement to late-arriving passengers?
56
There may be costs as well as benefits, of course. Palsgraf
becomes, it appears, a case akin to Carroll Towing.57 The question of
duty, for Cardozo and Weinrib a threshold matter, has now, we cannot
avoid recognizing, overlapped the question of negligence as such. We
have crossed into the realm of the Third Restatement 1999 Discussion
Draft: "duty is in truth a nonissue. ' '58  Not surprisingly, Professor
Weinrib disagrees with the Third Restatement. 59 There is more at stake
here, however, than just the good sense (or not) of "the standard view."6 °
increasingly in place by the 1920s. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920
286-302 (1967).
53. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
54. Id. We have no difficulty imagining these scenarios either.
55. Id.
56. This approach to Palsgraf is, of course, not new. See Note, Loss-Shifting and Quasi-
Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraf Case, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 737 (1941). The
"negligent mode of operation" approach is explained, and applied (likely controversially) in
Markowitz v. Helen Homes of Kendall, 826 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2002).
57. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). It is not
necessary, for present purposes, to explore the well-documented complexities-including various
alternate politics-implicit in the cost-benefit idea.
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. a (Discussion Draft at 83, 1999). The Draft
also emphasizes that there are exceptional cases in which duty is put in question. See id. § 6 &
comment c, 82, 83-87. Palsgraf does not appear in the discussion. See id., at 88-94.
59. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing of Palsgraf?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 803 (2001).
60. See supra note 36.
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The Restatement conclusion itself overlaps, even as it carefully
refrains from acknowledging, a distinctive approach to the law of torts-
call it "California Modern"-exemplified in the discussion of duty in
Dillon v. Legg.6 Sensitivity to the risk of unnecessarily limiting access
to courts prompted skepticism as to whether the problems posed in liti-
gating emotional distress claims were in any clear way different from
the usual difficulties of civil procedure.62 This skepticism, we know,
would not remain "in-courthouse," would in later cases reappear promi-
nently and controversially, for example, in judicial responses to invoca-
tions of industry practice and industry economics as decisive of products
liability controversies,63 and to invocation of a professional need for
confidentiality as similarly conclusive. 6 Individuals, akin to courts in
this regard, were held to a duty to inquire, to be prepared to reconsider
standard practice in light of circumstances. This obligation, it appeared,
did not derive from some sense of the requirements of "the public at
large," but instead presented itself as an essentially individual obliga-
tion, always defined only in context even if emblematic of civil sociabil-
ity, a duty to justify, to defend one's acts and thus derivatively (as it
were) a duty to do what one could, what was reasonably possible, to
minimize injury. Palsgraf after Ybarra and Tarasoff, as it were: It is
within this perspective, perhaps now no longer a "standard view," that
the responsibility of the administrators of the Long Island Railroad
stands out most clearly.6"
61. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). Dillon, we all remember, addressed duty in the particular
context of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress-specifically, in the case of a
mother witnessing the death of her young child. The Third Restatement puts outside its general
principles cases of claims of "emotional distress that are not the consequences of physical harm."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, at § 3, comment a, 37. It is not clear what the Restatement means
to make of cases in which emotional distress itself is asserted to be "physical harm." Palsgraf,
Richard Posner has documented, was one version of an emotional distress case-the explosion left
Helen Palsgraf with a stammer which presented itself (Posner thinks) because "the accident
triggered a latent psychiatric problem that the litigation made even worse." POSNER, supra note
39, at 35-36. The fact that the scale fell on Palsgraf, bruising her, see id. at 34, perhaps protects
Palsgraf from the Restatement exclusion. Palsgraf-or rather Helen Palsgraf-also reminds us
(along with Dillon) of the gendering often implicit in legal responses to emotional injury. See,
e.g., Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV.
751 (2001). Barbara Young Welke explores this topic at length and to great effect, within the
context of late nineteenth and early twentieth century railroad accidents and hazards. See YOUNG
WELKE, supra note 50, at 139-246. Richard Posner notes that Palsgraf was a single parent of two
children working as a janitor, and thus introduces a class element as well. See POSNER, supra note
39, at 33.
62. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 917-19. The importance of protecting access to courts was an
organizing theme in two famous predecessors. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1947);
Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948).
63. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-57 (Cal. 1978).
64. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976).
65. I discuss all of this at more length in an essay in progress entitled "California Modem."
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Professor Weinrib is not hostile to the idea of affirmative obliga-
tion.66 But neither Cardozo nor Weinrib explores the risk-administrative
reformulation of Palsgraf. Judging the guard's conduct in isolation,
obviously, is not required by the rule of respondeat superior. Risk man-
agers-whatever their particular title would have been in the 1920s-
would have been railroad employees also. The problem, we might
think, lies in the limits of the idea of corrective justice. Cardozo takes
for granted that the relevant "relation" is that between an individual
plaintiff and an individual defendant. Weinrib insists that "the justifica-
tory considerations must link two, and only two, parties [so that] one
party's normative gain [may be depicted as] the other's normative
lOSS. ' ' 67 This straightforward transactional template does not fit well
with Palsgraf as restated, however. The injured plaintiff Helen Palsgraf
is not the relevant actor from the risk management perspective-it is
rather the class of all platform users across some indefinite period of
time. There is also no individual defendant-the passenger car guard is
one relevant actor, whoever holds risk management responsibility is
another, whoever decides that the trains will run according to schedule is
still another, and so on. These actors make decisions at different points
in time. It is the inter-relationship of their decisions that is the problem
if this account rings true; it is the inter-relationship, really, that consti-
tutes the Long Island Railroad Company, at least as defendant in the
case. For purposes of judging the plausibility of these characterizations,
identifying pertinent risk classes and inter-relationships, Aristotle and
Kant do not (at least not without much exegesis) supply especially use-
ful starting points. Their formulations (and Weinrib's) become salient
only after the real work of analysis is already done. Weber and Foucault
may be more informative guides.
D.
This is, Weinrib might argue, all very much beside the point.
Coherence and its derivatives-law's increased justificatory capacity
and intelligibility 68-are well served in the Palsgraf setting by simply
identifying the railroad with the acts of its guard and analyzing accord-
ingly. To proceed using any approach other than corrective justice rig-
orously defined would quickly reduce to arbitrariness.69 This may not
be true: there may be conceptions of justice that are fundamentally non-
Aristotlean, that do not reduce to corrective or distributive principles.
66. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 (1980).
67. See WEINRIB, supra note 8, at 120.
68. See id. at 38-44.
69. See id. at 41.
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Some such conception might cover Palsgraf restated. It might be said,
less ambitiously but perhaps tellingly, that corrective justice itself
includes an element of justificatory arbitrariness if it can only be made
to fit the case through a procrustean reading of the facts. But tit for tat
arguments like this, it would seem, advance nothing.
Consider, instead, an affirmative defense:
For present purposes, a useful point of departure is "Repetition for
Itself," chapter II of Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition.7 °
Deleuze begins with Hume and ends up recasting Freud. The pertinent
points in this progression, I think, are these: Repetition is a matter of
mind, a synthesis-a "contraction"-of individual elements or cases. In
this respect, repetition is an exercise in passive imagination or contem-
plation; an on-going, pretty much nonconscious phenomenon that pre-
cedes or is otherwise bound up with the sense of time, habit, and
memory. But there are also active syntheses-for example, conscious
reconstructions of the past. Active exercises of imagination not only
draw upon the stock of passive syntheses, but also upon other active
exercises. There is no single synthesis, whether active or passive. As a
result, it is possible to describe various levels of synthesis, and to map
interactions across levels. These interactions may yield recurring orien-
tations-for example, Freud's pleasure principle and reality principle:
for Deleuze, both have equal status-and also artifacts or virtual objects
that figure in interactions along with real objects.
Virtual objects and real objects may both be subjects of contempla-
tion, pretty much interchangeably, whether passive or active. Deleuze
provides an example drawn from infant psychology: "Sucking occurs
only in order to provide a virtual object to contemplate ... ; conversely,
the real mother is contemplated only in order to provide a goal for the
activity, and a criterion by which to evaluate the activity... .", But a
virtual object is partial-"a fragment, a shred, or a remainder.""2
Repeated exercises in synthesis across multiple levels involving virtual
as well as real objects point to possibilities of distortions-disguises and
displacements-akin to instances of repression in the Freudian account.
Individual distortions might be identified and remedied; the existence of
70. DELEUZE, supra note 10, at 70-128. Paul Patton, in the "Translator's Preface," notes that
Difference and Repetition "is a work of prodigious conceptual invention." Id. at xi. Addressing
this work as a whole, in a properly engaged way, would be too large a task for this essay. The part
of Difference and Repetition that I do take up appears to me to suggest provocative extensions of
my discussions of Bernhard and Weinrib. I make no claim, however, that my use of Deleuze here
is a helpful guide to either Difference and Repetition as a whole or Deleuze's larger body of work.
For one attempt at supplying such guidance, see JOHN RAJCHMAN, THE DELEUZE CONNECTIONS
(2000).
71. DELEUZE, supra note 10, at 99.
72. Id. at 101.
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some distortions, of whatever content, is a persistent and ineradicable
by-product of the accumulating syntheses. In any arrangement of levels,
therefore, "there is no ultimate term."' 73 For Deleuze, stability or ground
can only take the form of questions or problems. "There are no ultimate
or original responses or solutions, there are only problem-questions, in
the guise of a mask behind every mask and a displacement behind every
place."74
It is obviously easy to read Correction after Deleuze, as it were.
Repetitions press; sequences built up from different perspectives inter-
act; the Cone, it would seem, is the quintessential virtual object; the text,
in the end, presents itself to its reader as a problem without ready resolu-
tion. The Idea of Private Law also invites Deleuze. Corrective justice
figures as the product of the interplay of Aristotle's initial formulation,
Kantian moral agency, and Weinrib's own conception of coherence.
Whether this production is simply an artifact, a distortion, another of
Deleuze's virtual objects, is plainly an apt question to ask. But we also
have enough, in even my overly simple summary, to fashion a more
general jurisprudential translation. (This is the affirmative defense.)
Plainly, contractions or syntheses-acknowledgements of repetitions
framed in terms of rules or standards or other forms-are commonplace
in law, accumulating continuously in multitudes of legal documents.
Some of these syntheses are routine and might be called passive.75
Others are consciously considered and actively worked out. The various
syntheses interact across sometimes highly fragmented levels. These
interactions may display frequently present (if never definitive) orienta-
tions or precipitate virtual objects. At least in part because they are dif-
ficult or impossible to eliminate entirely, it is not difficult to pick out
distortions-disguises and displacements-endemic in legal analysis
("legal fictions," as it were). It would not be at all surprising to con-
clude that recurring problems or questions supply the only relatively sta-
ble ground for a legal regime, like that of the United States, which is
characterized by multiple, fragmented levels and attending distortions.
Deleuze suggests, as it were, that a legal regime like ours may be, in
important respects, a large-scale version of Bernhard's Correction.
73. Id. at 105.
74. Id. at 107.
Questions and problems are not speculative acts, and as such completely provisional
and indicative of the momentary ignorance of an empirical subject. . . . The
problems "correspond" to the reciprocal disguise of the terms and relations which
constitute the reality series. The questions or sources of problems correspond to the
displacement of the virtual object which causes the series to develop.
Id. at 106-07.
75. This is just Holmes updated. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 31-32
(Howe ed. 1963) (1881).
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None of this, at least at first glance, appears to be especially radical
or controversial. There are, however, several notable follow-on conclu-
sions-tantamount, perhaps, to a jurisprudential manifesto:
First, the legal regime itself-the composite interacting levels of
synthesis-is the origin of distortion. Certain participants in the regime
may be associated with characteristic processes of distortion-making.
Duncan Kennedy's A Critique of Adjudication is one recent attempt to
map this sort of match-up.7 6 But the phenomenon is both chronic and
ubiquitous, one way or another aided and abetted in exercises in legal
synthesis at every level.77
Second, there may be good reason to question or re-situate efforts
like those of Ernest Weinrib or Ronald Dworkin or Herbert Wechsler to
identify notions of coherence or integrity or neutrality or such as dis-
tinctly "legal" values, properly governing at least some important subset
of the larger composite. Particular orientations, even if recurring, may
be fragmentary, artifacts of interactions across syntheses that are always
vulnerable to challenge as resting on distortions. "Values" are not legal
fundamentals: if anything, accumulating legal materials routinely work,
or are chronically prone to work, to put in question, counter, over-sim-
plify, over-qualify, or otherwise undercut values appearing "in" law.78
Third, there is no reason why participants in legal regimes cannot
press "internal" values like coherence or integrity or neutrality, just as
they might press any other values, subject to the counter-efforts of other
participants and the fragmenting and distorting effects of the various
accumulating and interacting legal syntheses. A legal regime is a politi-
cal environment (in effect complete with "weather") of a distinctive sort.
There is no mechanism akin to vote counting or market clearing rou-
tinely weeding "losing" positions out of the regime as a whole. 79 To be
sure, analogous mechanisms might appear as prominent elements of sub-
sets of the regime, but their overall significance may vary depending
76. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) (1997).
77. Peter Fenves moves in much the same direction in an extraordinary essay exploring
Schiller's idea of the "right of semblance":
[T]he legal order whose justification lies in its guardianship of das Recht, may only
appear legal; and rights, which would serve as the measure and guarantors of the
lawfulness of a legal order, would only be functions of fictional personae who are
made into semblances of themselves once they are cast-or magically cast
themselves into-the role of rights-bearing subjects.
Peter Fenves, On a Seeming Right to Semblance: Schiller, Hebel, and Kleist, in ARRESTING
LANGUAGE: FROM LEIBNITZ TO BENJAMIN 135 (2001); see also id. at 133-34.
78. See also Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority," in
ACTS OF RELIGION 231-58 (2002) (noting the inexpressibility of justice within law).
79. Ideas like stare decisis-which might generate at least partial orderings-are not
surprisingly understood to be problematic (even if nonetheless sometimes put to use).
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upon the impact of other interactions. There is no thorough-going
Habermas-like bar to strategy, theater, or disingenuousness. Such
modes of action, like all others, run risks of fragmentation and distor-
tion, and the countering efforts of opposing participants. It might be that
the appeal of coherence or integrity or neutrality is enhanced in an envi-
ronment of this sort, and will emerge (sometimes, anyway) in the course
of interacting syntheses.80 But such values do not figure as presupposi-
tions-rather, as results.
Fourth, insofar as legal institutions present themselves to partici-
pants as interacting levels of synthesis, critique stands as a constitutive
responsibility. If certain questions and problems appear within the legal
complex as coming closest to resembling common ground, it is not only
because such questions recur, but because proposed answers are regu-
larly revealed to incorporate displacements or disguises, or to make
decisive use of the truncated content of virtual objects. It is these exer-
cises in exposure that keep questions open, and at least potentially rele-
vant. The legal complex makes available and organizes access to
preemptive resolution and therefore to force (however filtered or many
steps removed). Access is not assured or regulated by any axiomatic or
otherwise well-established principle of justice. Internal instability,
rather-more precisely, the persistence of unresolved problems, and the
accompanying, repeated perception of too simple responses-is the reg-
ister of continuity, a measure of recurring use, and thus (however para-
doxical this may seem to be) the organizing form for legal order. It is
also, pretty much simultaneously, the organizing form for dissent: the
hint, at least, of the always available possibility of legal opposition. 8
80. On the use of metanorms to hold together a normative regime, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE
COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION 44-68 (1997).
81. For acute analysis of examples of legal opposition at the limit, see MARC LINDER, THE
SUPREME LABOR COURT IN NAZI GERMANY: A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS 246-90 (1987)
("Chapter 11: Jews.").
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